Peremptory Challenges: Free Strikes No More by Furman, H. Patrick
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship 
1993 
Peremptory Challenges: Free Strikes No More 
H. Patrick Furman 
University of Colorado Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal 
Procedure Commons, Law and Race Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, and the 
Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Citation Information 
H. Patrick Furman, Peremptory Challenges: Free Strikes No More, 22 COLO. LAW. 1449 (1993), available at 
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/796. 
Copyright Statement 
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and 
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is 
required. 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact jane.thompson@colorado.edu. 
Citation: 22 Colo. Law.  1449 1993 
Provided by: 
William A. Wise Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Mon Jul 17 19:19:06 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope






by H. Patrick Furman
L awyers exercise peremptory
challenges on the basis of an in-
finite number of hunches, gut
reactions, myths and stereo-
types, as well as an occasional serious
study. Jurors are excused for reasons as
straightforward as their beliefs and
their jobs, and for reasons as esoteric as
the bumper stickers on their cars and
the magazines to which they subscribe.
Jury selection remains a delicate art,
not a science.
The question arises as to where the
race of a prospective juror fits into this
art. A recent poll of nearly 800 jurors re-
vealed significant differences in the atti-
tudes of black jurors and white jurors.1
White jurors were far more likely than
black jurors to believe that blacks were
more apt to commit crimes than whites.
Black jurors were far more likely than
white jurors to believe that minority de-
fendants get a less fair trial than white
defendants. Given these results and pre-
vious anecdotal support for these propo-
sitions, it is not surprising that criminal
lawyers have used race as a basis for ex-
ercising peremptory challenges.
In the past few years, the U.S. and Col-
orado Supreme Courts have addressed
the question of whether the exercise of
peremptory challenges on the basis of
the race of the prospective juror is con-
stitutional. This article reviews the his-
tory of attacks on race-based perempto-
ry challenges and discusses the proce-
dures used to investigate and resolve
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such attacks. The article also contains a




Historically, the exercise of perempto-
ry challenges was not subjected to judi-
cial scrutiny or control. As stated by the
U.S. Supreme Court:
The essential nature of the perempto-
ry challenge is that it is one exercised
without a reason stated, without in-
quiry and without being subject to the
court's control.
2
In the 1965 case of Swain v. Alabama,
3
the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether the use of peremp-
tory challenges to strike prospective ju-
rors on the basis of their race should be
subject to judicial scrutiny. The defen-
dant, who was black, contested the use
of peremptory challenges by the prose-
cutor to exclude all the prospective ju-
rors who were black. The Court held that
this action by the prosecutor did not vio-
late the defendant's right to the equal
protection of the law because the defen-
dant was entitled only to a jury which
was impartial, not one which was repre-
sentative of the community.
The Court noted that a different issue
would be raised if the defendant could
establish that there was an historical
pattern of prosecutorial discrimination
against jurors on the basis of race. The
Court intimated that proof of a system-
atic exclusion of minority jurors would
raise different equal protection issues
and might require a different result. Es-
tablishing such a pattern required a
great deal of investigation and was ex-
tremely difficult.
In the 1986 case of Batson v. Ken-
tucky,4 the U.S. Supreme Court recog-
nized this difficulty and significantly re-
duced the burden of proof on the defen-
dant. The Batson Court held that a black
criminal defendant could establish
a prima facie case of purposeful dis-
crimination in selection of the petit ju-
ry solely on evidence concerning the
prosecutor's exercise of peremptory
challenges at the defendant's trial.
5
The requirement that the defendant es-
tablish a systematic exclusion of minor-
ity jurors over a series of trials was
dropped. The challenges made in a sin-
gle trial, as well as the comments and
questions of the prosecutor during voir
dire and the challenging process, could,
under Batson, establish an improper mo-
tivation.
Batson, like Swain, was based on the
right of a minority defendant to the equal
protection of the law, the law being the
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury. However, the Court gave a hint of
things to come by noting that the exclu-
sion of a juror based on race deprives that
juror of the right to serve on a jury and
that such a denial may implicate the ju-
ror's right to the equal protection of the
law.
The Colorado Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue the next year in Fields
v. People.6 In this case, a black defendant
was challenging the exclusion of Span-
This newsletter is prepared by the
Criminal Law Section of the Colorado
Bar Association. This month's column
was written by column editor H. Pat-
rick Furman.
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ish-surnamed jurors from the jury by
the prosecutor.7 The Supreme Court
adopted the Sixth Amendment analysis
used by various state courts,8 rather
than the Batson analysis, and held that
race-based peremptory challenges by
the prosecutor implicated the defen-
dant's right to an impartial jury under
both the Sixth Amendment and Article
II, § 16 of the Colorado Constitution. The
Fields court adopted the procedure set
forth in Batson for proving such a claim
and held that a defendant may establish
a prima facie case of racial discrimina-
tion in the selection of the jury solely on
the basis of the challenges made by the
prosecution in that trial. The defendant
in Fields, however, lost his appeal be-
cause the court found legitimate race-
neutral reasons for challenging three of
the four minority jurors at issue.
The Colorado Supreme Court in Fields
suggested that the equal protection ar-
gument was available only to defendants
who were of the same class as the chal-
lenged jurors, although they did not de-
cide this issue. The right to an impartial
jury based on a fair cross-section of the
community is available to all defendants,
regardless of race, and the concerns pro-
tected by that right outweighed, in the
court's opinion, the danger of imposing
limits on the prosecutor's use of peremp-
tory challenges.
Swain and Batson were based on the
principle that a defendant has an equal
protection right to an impartial jury and
that this right is infringed when prospec-
tive minority jurors are excluded from ju-
ry service in the trial of a minority defen-
dant. The white defendant in Holland v.
Illinois9 attempted to reach the same re-
sult under a purely Sixth Amendment
analysis. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that there was no Sixth Amendment
right protecting a white defendant who
complained that the prosecutor was
striking blacks from the jury. However,
a majority of the Court indicated that any
defendant, regardless of race, would have
standing to raise a claim asserting the
excluded juror's equal protection right to




In 1991, the focus of the decisions on
this issue shifted to the equal protection
right of every citizen to sit on a jury, re-
gardless of race. This change in ration-
ale, illustrated by Powers v. Ohio," had
significant repercussions.
In Powers, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that a white defendant had stand-
ing to contest the discriminatory use of
a peremptory challenge on a black pro-
spective juror. The Court held that the
defendant had third-party standing to
assert this claim on behalf of the juror
because the defendant and the juror
shared a common interest on the issue
and the juror was unlikely to ever assert
the right in a separate action. The Court
then held that the juror had an equal
protection right to participate equally in
civil life and that this right was impaired
if a juror was stricken from a jury on the
basis of race.
"In 1991, the focus shifted
to the equal protection right of
every citizen to sit on a jury,
regardless of race."
Once the Court adopted the conclusion
that the equal protection right ofjurors
was the right being protected, expan-
sion of the right to contest racially moti-
vated peremptory challenges was inevit-
able. The U.S. Supreme Court extended
the right to civil litigants12 and, in Geor-
gia v. McCollum, 3 to prosecutors alleg-
ing that peremptory challenges by de-
fense counsel were racially motivated.
The McCollum decision recognized
that giving prosecutors the right to at-
tack peremptory challenges by defense
counsel altered the balance of power in
the courtroom and invaded on the tradi-
tional view of a defendant's right to the
assistance of counsel. However, the Court
found that peremptory challenges by a
criminal defendant constituted state ac-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment
and that the exercise of this state action
was controlled by the equal protection
clause of that Amendment.
Procedure
It is now clear that the peremptory
challenges of both the prosecutor and
the defense lawyer are subject to an at-
tack that they are motivated by racial
considerations. A number of recent cas-
es, at both the state and federal level,
have addressed the procedural issues
which have inevitably arisen in connec-
tion with these attacks.
A party who believes that opposing
counsel is improperly exercising peremp-
tory challenges on the basis of race has
the duty to raise the claim during the ju-
ry selection process. Counsel cannot wait
until after the jury is sworn to raise the
claim. 14 The party making this claim
has the burden of establishing a prima
facie case of racial discrimination. 5
The trial court must then decide wheth-
er a prima facie case of racially motivat-
ed challenges has been made out. The
Colorado Supreme Court has held that
a single peremptory challenge generally
does not establish discriminatory in-
tent.16 However, a single challenge which
results in no members of a cognizable ra-
cial minority remaining on the jury has
been held to establish a prima facie case
by the Colorado Court of Appeals.
Aprima facie case may be based on the
questions and comments of counsel as
well as the actual strikes.I8 For exam-
ple, support for a prima facie case has
been found in the fact that a prosecutor
asked a prospective African-American
juror if he knew anyone who had been
charged with robbery but asked pro-
spective white jurors if they knew any-
one who had been the victim of a rob-
bery.
19
If the court finds that aprima facie
case has been established, the burden
shifts to the party making the peremp-
tory challenge to show that there are le-
gitimate race-neutral explanations for
the peremptory challenges.2° Finally, the
party contesting the peremptory chal-
lenges is entitled to respond to the race-
neutral explanations offered by the at-
torney who made the challenges.
2
1
This same procedure applies when
the apparently discriminatory challenge
is made to keep a minority juror off the
jury by placing that juror in the alter-
nate's seat. In People v. Portley,22 the tri-
al judge used a variation on the tradi-
tional method of selecting the jury that
included assigning numbers to th e
prospective jurors so that the attorneys
knew who the replacement juror would
be when they struck a juror. There was
only one African-American in the jury
panel, and the prosecutor used a peremp-
tory challenge in such a fashion as to
place that juror in the second alternate
spot on the jury. The defendant argued
that this use of the peremptory challenge
violated Batson. The prosecutor argued
that the defendant had not even made
out a prima facie case of discrimination,
and the trial court agreed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals re-
versed the defendant's conviction. Even
though the African-American juror was
THE COLORADO LAWYER July1450
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neither challenged nor excluded, the net
effect of the prosecutor's action was to
minimize or eliminate the possibility that
the juror would deliberate. In fact, the
juror did not deliberate. The court con-
cluded that the defendant had made out
a prima facie case and that the prosecu-
tor should have been required to offer a
racially neutral explanation for the
challenge. The case was remanded for
this purpose.
Race-Neutral Explanations
Counsel whose peremptory challenges
are contested must respond with a race-
neutral explanation only if the trial court
finds that a prima facie case of racial
discrimination has been established.2
However, if counsel jumps the gun and
offers explanations for the challenges
before the trial court makes the finding
that a prima facie case has been estab-
lished, the Colorado appellate courts will
consider counsel's explanations any-
way.24 The explanations offered by coun-
sel must be "clear and reasonably specif-
ic" and related to the particular case.
25
By the very nature of a peremptory chal-
lenge, the explanations do not have to
rise to the level of a challenge for cause,2
but they must rise above counsel's as-
sumption that the prospective juror is
less able to serve because of race.2 7
A number of decisions address the
question of what constitutes a race-neu-
tral justification for a peremptory chal-
lenge. The U.S. Supreme Court held that
it was legitimate for a prosecutor to strike
four Latino jurors on the grounds that
two of the jurors had relatives who had
been prosecuted by his office and that
he feared the other two Latinos, both of
whom spoke Spanish, would not be will-
ing to rely solely on the official transla-
tion when listening to evidence present-
ed in Spanish. The Supreme Court re-
fused to disturb the trial court's finding
of fact and noted that a racially disparate
result of peremptory challenges is not
enough: there must be a showing of dis-
criminatory intent.
In People v. Arrington,m the Colorado
Court of Appeals reversed the defen-
dant's murder conviction after finding
that the "race-neutral" explanations of-
fered by the prosecutor who struck the
sole remaining African-American juror
were not, in fact, race neutral. There
were two African-Americans on the jury
panel. One was excused for cause. The
remaining African-American was ques-
tioned extensively about race and dis-
crimination, and it was learned that he
was the plaintiff in an employment dis-
crimination suit. He stated that he could
be fair and impartial and that his race
would not be a factor. The prosecutor
challenged him.
The defendant objected to the exclu-
sion of this juror, and the prosecutor re-
sponded that he had two race-neutral
reasons: the evidence included racial
slurs, and the defendant's father had
once claimed that the defendant's arrest
was racially motivated. The court found
that the two reasons given here were
both race specific: both reasons
were based strictly upon the prose-
cutor's subjective belief that [juror's]
race would cause him not to be impar-
tial in a case against a black defen-
dant.2
Under these circumstances, the prose-
cutor failed to rebut the defendant's pri-
ma facie case, and the defendant was
granted a new trial.
Several federal circuit court decisions
have addressed the issue of whether
counsel's explanations are race-neutral.
For example, in the Seventh Circuit, a
prosecutor who struck an African-Amer-
ican juror in the trial of an African-Amer-
ican defendant justified his challenge by
claiming that the juror had not demon-
strated an adequate understanding of the
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a "feeling" about her that was not race-
based. The court's review of the record
convinced it that the juror's answers to
questions about the burden of proof mir-
rored those of white jurors who were not
challenged. The court ordered a new tri-
al.30
Similarly, a prosecutor who explained
that he struck a juror not because she
was black, but because she lived in a pre-
dominantly low-income black neighbor-
hood and was therefore more likely to
believe that the police "pick on black peo-
ple," was found to be making generic and
unsupported assumptions that people
who live "in an area heavily populated
by poor black people could not fairly try
a black defendant."31 Therefore, the court
ordered a new trial.
The use of a juror's nationality and
the attitudes the prosecutor associated
with that nationality were held to be an
inadequate explanation by the U.S.
Court of Military Appeals in United
States v. Greene.32 A black male soldier
was accused of sexually assaulting a
white female soldier, and the prosecutor
challenged a black, Panamanian-born
male juror. The prosecutor argued,
among other things, that a three-year
tour of duty in Panama had left him with
the belief that Panamanian men had dif-
ferent attitudes about sex and a male's
right to sex. The prosecutor believed that
such men had a "macho" attitude about
sex and were more likely than others to
believe a man had a "right" to sex. The
court found this to be a racial stereotype
without any support in the answers giv-
en during voir dire.
Finally, a prosecutor in the Ninth Cir-
cuit who struck the only Hispanic juror
and the only Hispanic alternate explained
his challenges by stating that they were
based on the age, residence, type of em-
ployment and appearance of those ju-
rors. However, the record revealed that
a white juror with the same residence
was not struck and that there had not
been any discussion of age with the ju-
rors. The court recognized that employ-
ment and appearance might constitute
legitimate race-neutral explanations of
a peremptory challenge. However, it re-
versed the conviction on the grounds that
at least two of the four proffered expla-
nations appeared to be shams and there
was an inadequate record as to the re-
maining two proffered explanations.33
Remaining Procedural Details
There are several remaining issues
which should be addressed when deal-
ing with the adequacy of counsel's expla-
nations for peremptory challenges.
Mixed Explanations
The first issue is whether an attorney
who has offered both a race-neutral and
a race-based explanation for a peremp-
tory challenge has met the burden of es-
tablishing a race-neutral explanation.
Batson held that peremptory strikes are
improper when based "solely on account
of [the juror's] race,"34 suggesting that a
strike based partially on race and par-
tially on a legitimate reason might be
acceptable. Neither the U.S. nor Colo-
rado Supreme Court has directly ad-
dressed this question. However, the Col-
orado Court of Appeals has held that
if even one explanation was insuffi-
cient, the [trial] court should have
ruled that the exclusion violated both
the defendant's and the prospective
juror's equal protection rights.5
Other courts that have addressed the
question have reached conflicting re-
sults. For example, the U.S. Court of Mil-
itary Appeals has interpreted Batson to
require that "all the reasons proffered by
trial counsel be untainted by any inher-
ently discriminatory motives,"3 6 while
the Eighth Circuit has held that one
valid explanation is all that is necessary
tojustify a peremptory strike, even when





A second point is that a trial court rul-
ing on the question of whether counsel's
explanation for apparently racially mo-
tivated challenges is race-neutral must
make adequate findings to allow an ap-
pellate court to review the ruling. 38 A
simple finding that there has not been
any systematic exclusion of minority ju-
rors is inadequate.9 Inadequate findings
by the trial court may result in an order
for a new trial from an appellate court if
it proves too difficult to reconstruct the
motives underlying the peremptory chal-
lenges. 4°
The fact that some minority jurors do
eventually end up sitting on the jury is
not dispositive of the question of wheth-
er counsel's peremptory challenges have
been improperly motivated by race. One
court has held that once a prima facie
case of racial discrimination has been
established, the fact that one or more
minority jurors remain on the jury is ir-
relevant.4' However, it also has been
held that leaving minority jurors on the
jury, particularly when counsel has per-
emptory challenges remaining and does
not use them, is evidence of a lack of dis-
criminatory intent.
42
The fact that a trial court believes that
the exclusion of minority jurors both
helps and hurts a litigant should not be
the basis for a ruling. Because it is the
equal protection right of the stricken ju-
ror that is being protected, the question
of whether the exclusion helps or hurts
a litigant is immaterial. 43
Limited Appellate Review
Finally, counsel should be aware that
appellate review will be limited. Trial
court rulings concerning jury selection
have traditionally been given deference,
and this same deference is given to trial
court rulings on the adequacy of coun-
sel's explanations for peremptory chal-
lenges.44 Trial judges are in the best po-
sition to evaluate peremptory challenges
and the explanations for those challenges
because of their knowledge of local con-
ditions and their ability to observe the
process.45 A trial court ruling on the ade-
quacy of such an explanation will nor-




Lawyers often exercise peremptory
challenges on the basis of the gender of
the prospective juror, although the ques-
tion of whether a male or female juror is
better for any particular type of case re-
mains the subject of much dispute. The
previously mentioned juror poll noted
some differences between male and fe-
male jurors. For example, both male and
female jurors felt that female jurors were
"more thoughtful" in reviewing the evi-
dence and were "more ready to speak up
during deliberations."47 Although these
differences may not be as dramatic as
those found between black and white ju-
rors, they are certainly worth considera-
tion by anyone picking a jury.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not de-
cided whether the Batson rationale
should be applied to peremptory chal-
lenges based on other attributes ofju-
rors. For example, while the Court has
held that gender discrimination in de-
termining who is called for jury duty is
unconstitutional,4 it has not yet decided
whether peremptory challenges based
on the gender of the prospective juror vi-
olate the equal protection rights of that
juror or the defendant. The Court recent-
1452
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ly granted certiorari in an Alabama case
raising this issue and should render a de-
cision next ter.
49
However, at least one lower court has
extended the Batson analysis to peremp-
tory strikes based on the gender of pro-
spective jurors. In United States v. De-
Gross,50 the prosecution complained that
the female defendant was striking male
jurors, and the defendant complained
that the prosecution was striking fe-
male jurors. The defendant struck seven
males, and the trial court found that this
amounted to a prima facie case of gen-
der discrimination. The prosecution ad-
mitted that it struck a female to try and
achieve some gender balance on the jury.
In DeGross, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the Batson analysis
applied to peremptory challenges based
on gender because they, like peremptory
challenges based on race, were predicat-
ed on the improper assumption that a par-
ticular group of people was either un-
qualified for jury service or could not be
fair. The court also noted that these
strikes excluded and therefore harmed
a distinct group of people, harmed com-
munity participation injury service and
undermined public confidence in the ju-
ry system, just as do challenges based
on race. The court went on to hold that
the challenges from both parties were
improper and ordered a new trial.
However, the Fifth Circuit and most
state courts which have considered wheth-
er to extend the Batson analysis to gen-
der-based peremptory challenges have
refused to do so. In United States v. Ham-
ilton,51 the defendant argued that the
prosecutor had challenged certain pro-
spective jurors on the basis of race. The
prosecutor responded by explaining that
he had struck the jurors on the basis of
gender, not race. The Fourth Circuit ex-
pressly refused to extend the Batson
analysis to peremptory challenges based
on gender, noting that it did not "ap-
plaud" any peremptory challenge based
on a group classification, but read the
decision in Batson to apply only to per-
emptory challenges based on race.
52
Conclusion
Peremptory challenges, which went
unregulated by the courts throughout
most of American legal history, are now
being subjected to scrutiny by the courts
to ensure that they are not being used
in a racially discriminatory fashion. The
already difficult task of selecting a jury
has been complicated by this develop-
ment, and a whole new set of arguments
and counter-arguments are now avail-
able to counsel injury selection.
Inquiry into racially discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges seems here
to stay, and this scrutiny may be extend-
ed to gender-based challenges as well.
The courts are unlikely to allow much
further expansion of the inquiry into
peremptory challenges but have not yet
set any precise limits. Trial attorneys
will undoubtedly continue to test these
limits as this area of law continues to
evolve.
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Notice to Estate Planning Practitioners
-NEW PROBATE FORMS-
The Colorado Supreme Court has approved the following new probate forms:
Form Title
CPC29 Petition for Appointment of Conservator
CPC30A Order Appointing Conservator (Adult)
CPC30M Order Appointing Conservator (Minor)
CPC32 Petition for Appointment of Guardian for Incapacitated Person
CPC33 Order Appointing Guardian for Incapacitated Person
CPC34 Petition for Appointment of Guardian for Minor
CPC35 Order Appointing Guardian for Minor
CPC40 Affidavit for Collection of Personal Property Pursuant to Small Estate
CPC24/25-S Schedule of Distribution
CPC25-H Schedule of Heirship
CPC2GC Notice of Hearing to Protected Person or Incapacitated Person
Full Service Broker
Including: Employee Benefits
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